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Abstract Michael Bergmann seeks to motivate his externalist, proper function 
theory of epistemic justiﬁcation by providing three objections to the mentalism and 
mentalist evidentialism characteristic of nonexternalists such as Richard Feldman 
and Earl Conee. Bergmann argues that (i) mentalism is committed to the false thesis 
that justiﬁcation depends on mental states; (ii) mentalism is committed to the false 
thesis that the epistemic ﬁttingness of an epistemic input to a belief-forming process 
must be due to an essential feature of that input, and, relatedly, that mentalist 
evidentialism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic ﬁttingness of 
doxastic response B to evidence E is an essential property of B–E; and (iii) mentalist 
evidentialism is ‘‘unmotivated’’. I object to each argument. The argument for (i) 
begs the question. The argument for (ii) suffers from the fact that mentalist evi­
dentialists are not committed to the consequences claimed for them; nevertheless, 
I show that there is, in the neighborhood, a substantive dispute concerning the nature 
of doxastic epistemic ﬁttingness. That dispute involves what I call ‘‘Necessary 
Fittingness’’, the view that, necessarily, exactly one (at most) doxastic attitude 
(belief, or  disbelief, or  suspension of judgment) toward a proposition is epistemically 
ﬁtting with respect to a person’s total evidence at any time. Reﬂection on my super-
blooper epistemic design counterexamples to Bergmann’s proper function theory 
reveals both the plausibility of Necessary Fittingness and a good reason to deny (iii). 
Mentalist evidentialism is thus vindicated against the objections. 
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In his book, Justiﬁcation Without Awareness, Michael Bergmann (2006)1 argues 
that epistemic externalism about epistemic justiﬁcation is theoretically preferable to 
any nonexternalism.2 Toward this end, he seeks to motivate our interest in his 
externalist, proper function theory of epistemic justiﬁcation, by providing objections 
to leading nonexternalist epistemic theories. Notably, he makes three objections to 
what he calls CF-mentalism, which is essential not only to the evidentialist view of 
epistemic justiﬁcation endorsed by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (2004a, 2008) 
but also to the vast majority of nonexternalist theories of epistemic justiﬁcation. 
Thus, Bergmann’s objections to CF-mentalism threaten a broad swath of traditional 
epistemic theories. 
I argue that none of the three objections provides good reason to deny 
CF-mentalism; thus, the objections provide no good reason to favor externalism over 
nonexternalism. Finally, I provide a counterexample to Bergmann’s own externalist 
theory. Since reﬂection on the example also reveals substantial assets of CF-mentalism 
and versions of evidentialism, the combination of the example and my defense of 
CF-mentalism provides reason to prefer theories committed to CF-mentalism over 
Bergmann’s externalist theory of justiﬁcation. 
1 On Bergmann’s ﬁrst objection 
According to CF-mentalism (hereafter, mentalism), all the factors that contribute to 
epistemic justiﬁcation (hereafter, justiﬁcation) are in a person’s mind. Conee and 
Feldman (2004b, p. 56) point out its two essential theses: (S) and (M): 
S: ‘‘The justiﬁcatory status of a person’s doxastic attitudes strongly supervenes 
on the person’s occurrent and dispositional mental states, events, and 
conditions’’; and, 
M: ‘‘If any two possible individuals are exactly alike mentally, then they are 
alike justiﬁcationally, e.g., the same beliefs are justiﬁed for them to the same 
extent’’. 
Bergmann’s ﬁrst objection to mentalism3 is as follows: (S & M) commits one to 
the mistaken thesis that 
A: mental states are the only sorts of things that can be appropriate epistemic 
inputs to our belief-forming processes. (2006, p. 63) 
1 Chapters 7 and 8 are excellent additions to the literature concerning dialectical disputes between 
epistemic internalists and externalists. For critical discussion, see Rogers and Matheson (2009). 
2 Although Bergmann (2006, pp. 55–7) claims that there are nonexternalist epistemic theories (including 
that of Conee and Feldman) that are neither internalist nor externalist, I’ll use ‘‘nonexternalist’’ to mean 
any theory of epistemic justiﬁcation that is not an externalist theory. 
3 Bergmann (2006, p. 48) converts Conee and Feldman’s description of mentalism into a form he ﬁnds 
amenable to doxastic justiﬁcation, which is his subject: ‘‘A belief’s justiﬁcation is a function solely of (i) 
which mental states the subject is in and (ii) which mental states of the subject the belief is based on. (i.e., 
if two possible subjects are exactly alike mentally and in terms of which of their mental states their beliefs 
are based on, then they are exactly alike justiﬁcationally)’’. 
Bergmann’s reason for thinking that (A) is mistaken is his intuitive judgment about 
a type of case: 
… many externalists will be inclined to think it is possible for God, if he 
exists, to reveal things to us (thereby giving us justiﬁed beliefs in the truths so 
revealed) by directly causing beliefs in us, without the causal intermediation 
of other mental states. My rejection of the mentalist answer … [A] is based on 
this very line of thought. It just seems, intuitively, that such divinely caused 
beliefs could be justiﬁed. Hence, it seems intuitively that the mentalist answer 
… [A] is mistaken. 
The divine revelation example is a convenient one mainly because it is easy to 
make clear that there are no mental states that are mediating causes of the 
belief: God simply causes the belief in us directly.4 (2006, pp. 63–4) 
I suppose that some epistemic externalists would agree with Bergmann’s judgment 
but quite a few would not. Consider attempts by some externalists to deny that 
BonJour’s Norman the Clairvoyant—who has beliefs produced by a reliable 
clairvoyant process—has justiﬁed clairvoyant beliefs5; and, consider the huge 
percentage of epistemic internalists (including some who think that religious beliefs 
can be epistemically justiﬁed) who would disagree. Bergmann (2006, p. 64) 
concedes that his objection to thesis (A) is persuasive only to non-mentalists; and, 
his intuitive judgment of the example (and another like it)6 is the only reason he 
offers against (A). Notably, that judgment is a minority judgment among 
epistemologists. Furthermore, from the perspective of what we might call the 
non-skeptical tradition—which is the perspective that Bergmann takes in his 
book—all the uncontroversial cases of justiﬁed belief involve mental-state inputs. 
So, if we are going to rely merely on intuitive judgments—as Bergmann does on 
4 Bergmann’s commentary suggests that mentalism is committed to the following: necessarily, 
doxastically justiﬁed beliefs are caused by mental states. Not so: Feldman and Conee require basing 
but do not say that the basing must be causal. Nevertheless, as Kevin McCain pointed out to me, 
Bergmann’s objection doesn’t depend on the causal claim: the main dispute is whether mental states are 
necessary for justiﬁcation. 
5 See BonJour (1985, p. 41). My point is not that such externalists will necessarily think that the two 
cases stand or fall together; rather, some externalists seem keen to place restrictions on which reliable 
causal processes are epistemically appropriate, and divine revelation (in the absence of anything mental 
such as a sense of the divine) is surely among the controversial ones. 
Commenting on cases of reliable clairvoyants, Bergmann (2006, p. 141) says that, if we stipulate that 
their faculties are functioning properly, ‘‘… we have to admit that their clairvoyant beliefs are no more 
strange than our a priori or memory or perceptual beliefs’’. But, that is false, since clairvoyant beliefs are 
ones that just pop into a person’s head helter-skelter, whereas the other kinds are typically related to 
common experiences (namely, seeing-the-truth experiences, memory experiences, and perceptual 
experiences, respectively). 
6 Bergmann’s other example: ‘‘Imagine alien cognizers who form the belief that there is water nearby via 
a belief-forming process that bypasses their other mental states. Suppose, for example, that water in the 
environment of these aliens causes in them the belief that there is water nearby, without using any other 
mental states as intermediate causes of those beliefs. And suppose, furthermore, that these beliefs are not 
only reliably formed but also formed in accord with what counts as proper function for these cognizers’’ 
(2006, p. 64). As I point out in the text, Bergmann himself thinks that reliable belief formation is 
unnecessary for justiﬁcation; and, if you think that the proper function mentioned in the example makes a 
difference, see my counterexample in Sect. 2.5. 
this issue—then the majority view of the example and intuitive judgments of 
uncontroversial cases provide modest reason to favor (A) over its denial. So, the 
objection to mentalism fails. 
2 On Bergmann’s second objection 
Issues central to the second objection motivate the bulk of Bergmann’s criticism of 
mentalism and mentalism-entailed evidentialism. Bergmann (2006, pp. 52, 63, 113) 
argues that endorsing mentalism commits one to the mistaken thesis that 
B: the epistemic ﬁttingness of any input to our belief-forming processes must 
be due to an essential feature (rather than a contingent feature) of that input. 
His big-picture objection to thesis (B): Bergmann’s own externalist, proper function 
theory of justiﬁcation (hereafter, proper function justiﬁcation) preserves the 
theoretical assets of mentalism and Feldman-Conee-style evidentialism illustrated 
by certain examples,7 but, unlike mentalism, proper function justiﬁcation allows the 
epistemic appropriateness of an input to be a contingent feature of it; thus, he 
argues, mentalism has no theoretical advantage over proper function justiﬁcation; 
and, since proper function justiﬁcation—which entails the denial of (B)—jibes 
better with some intuitive epistemic evaluations with respect to some other 
examples than does mentalism, proper function justiﬁcation is theoretically 
preferable. 
2.1 Why mentalists are not committed to (B) as characterized 
Before considering those other examples, it would be helpful to consider what 
Bergmann is charging mentalists as holding. I take it that Bergmann has us consider 
thesis (B) in the interest of isolating the simplest feature of what it is that he wants to 
criticize about mentalism. But, there is trouble here, for mentalists are not 
committed to (B) as Bergmann characterizes it. We will need to do some sorting to 
discover just how it is that the examples Bergmann uses reveal what he ﬁnds 
objectionable about mentalism. To make sense of the examples we will later 
evaluate, we need to understand how Bergmann’s criticisms rely on some claims 
about design plans for belief-formation. 
Bergmann draws our attention to two possible ‘‘design plans’’, where a design 
plan is the complete description of the natural way of functioning for a cognizer.8 
According to ‘‘the human design plan’’, cognizers function properly when they form 
belief B1: there is a smallish hard round object in my hand, as an unlearned causal 
response to having ‘‘main evidence’’ ME1: tactile sensations of the type you 
experience when you grab a billiard ball. According to ‘‘design plan B’’, cognizers 
function properly when they form belief B1 as an unlearned causal response to 
7 That is, proper function justiﬁcation implies the same, correct epistemic evaluations with respect to
 
examples that Feldman and Conee use to illustrate the merits of their view.
 
8 In this section I summarize relevant parts of Bergmann (2006, Chap. 5).
 
having ‘‘main evidence’’ ME2: olfactory sensations of the type you experience when 
you smell a meadow full of ﬂowers. Bergmann claims that the two processes are on 
an epistemic par. They exhibit, he thinks, ways in which the epistemic ﬁttingness of 
evidential inputs to a belief-forming process can vary with respect to cognizers’ 
design plans: although the human design plan makes it epistemically ﬁtting for us to 
form B1 on the basis of ME1 (but not on the basis of ME2), it could be that some 
nonhuman design plan makes it epistemically ﬁtting for some nonhuman persons to 
form B1 on the basis of ME2 (but not on the basis of ME1); thus, he says, thesis (B) 
is false. 
The story and the moral Bergmann draws from it are supposed to be problematic 
for mentalists, but how so? We are invited to think that mentalism commits one to 
the view that ME1, but not ME2, can be an epistemically ﬁtting input to a belief-
forming process that results in B1; in other words, mentalism implies that ME1, but 
not ME2, can be a justiﬁer for B1. But, mentalism does not imply this. Indeed, 
Conee and Feldman—the very mentalists that Bergmann is criticizing—have an 
excellent reason internal to their view of epistemic justiﬁcation for denying thesis 
(B) as Bergmann characterizes it, and yet they remain consistent mentalists. This 
reason has to do with their view that it is one’s total evidence that matters for 
epistemic justiﬁcation. For instance, take the sensory experience that one might 
consider to be an input to a belief-forming process resulting in an external world 
belief such as B1. Conee and Feldman (2008) explicitly deny that sensory 
experience alone can justify any external world belief. On their view of justiﬁcation, 
it is something about the total evidence (including background evidence, concept 
acquisition, etc.) that people typically have that justiﬁes external world beliefs. 
Their particular theory, which they describe as an ‘‘explanatory coherence view of 
evidential support’’ (hereafter, the EC view), is that what justiﬁes such a belief 
involves ‘‘the best available explanation of one’s evidence’’, where that explanation 
consists of ‘‘a body of propositions about the world and one’s place in it that make 
the best sense of the existence of one’s evidence’’ (Conee and Feldman 2008, p. 98). 
Describing the EC view as a non-traditional version of coherentism, they say, ‘‘The 
coherence that justiﬁes holds among propositions that assert the existence of the 
non-doxastic states that constitute one’s ultimate evidence and propositions that 
offer an optimal available explanation of the existence of that evidence’’ (Conee and 
Feldman 2008, p. 98). Perceptual experiences, then, can contribute to the 
justiﬁcation of an external world proposition for a person when that proposition 
is part of the best explanation available to the person of that person’s experiences. 
Accordingly, they might acknowledge that a sensory experience counts as an 
‘‘epistemic input’’ in a typical case of justiﬁed external world belief (so long as ‘‘an 
epistemic input’’ means ‘‘something that contributes to justiﬁcation’’), since a 
sensory experience is part of the total evidence one has in such a case. But, they are 
not committed to the view that any particular sensory ‘‘input’’ is, in isolation, 
epistemically ﬁtting. 
Consider how these points bear on Bergmann’s criticism of mentalism. 
Bergmann apparently thinks that mentalism entails that, if there is a world (such 
as what we take to be ours) in which ME1 justiﬁes B1, then there is no possible 
world in which ME2 justiﬁes B1 (and vice versa). As I have noted, mentalism does 
not entail that there is any world in which ME1 (or ME2) in isolation justiﬁes B1. 
Nevertheless, consider the possibilities on the EC view. The view does not preclude 
ME2’s contributing to the justiﬁcation of B1 for a person. Suppose a world in which 
a person S grows up in a community of folk whose testimony concerning the 
relation between ME2 and the content of B1 always conﬁrms the view that ME2 
indicates the presence of a hard round object in one’s hand, and suppose that S’s 
own ME2 experiences always conﬁrm the relation. In such a case, ME2 could 
contribute to the justiﬁcation of B1 for S, since ME2 could be part of the set of 
experiences that B1 best explains for S. Thus, the EC view, and thus mentalism, 
does not entail that ME2 cannot be an epistemic input to a belief-forming process 
that results in B1’s being justiﬁed for a person; that is, mentalism does not entail that 
ME2 cannot be epistemically ﬁtting. On the contrary, it could be. 
There are two complicating issues worth discussing. First, we should be careful 
in saying that the EC view allows for either ME1 or ME2 to be an epistemically 
ﬁtting input to a process resulting in the formation of B1. The EC view would 
characterize either ME1 or ME2 as an epistemically ﬁtting input only if it were 
suitably related to other epistemic inputs of the cognizer. Still, there is a 
straightforward sense in which the EC view is consistent with Bergmann’s claim 
that either ME1 or ME2 could be epistemically ﬁtting and thus be a justiﬁer of B1. 
So, mentalism is consistent with a human-design-planned cognizer’s forming B1 
justiﬁedly upon experiencing ME1, and mentalism is consistent with a non-human­
design-planned cognizer’s forming B1 justiﬁedly upon experiencing ME2. Thus, 
whatever thesis (B) actually expresses, Bergmann’s commentary on (B) gives us no 
reason to think that mentalists are committed to a false thesis. 
Second, Bergmann says that B1 can be justiﬁed for a person even though it is an 
unlearned causal response to either ME1 or ME2. The fact that this external world 
belief is unlearned should give us pause. Typical justiﬁed external world beliefs are 
surely learned doxastic responses. I cannot think of any uncontroversial case of an 
unlearned doxastic attitude that is justiﬁed. So, I doubt that we have any familiar 
cases of the sort on which to rely in support of Bergmann’s conclusion about the 
case. In the end, I do not think that Bergmann’s main criticism of mentalism with 
respect to thesis (B) and Necessity (discussed below) turns on this issue of whether 
unlearned external world beliefs can be justiﬁed, but if it does, we should note two 
things: (i) Bergmann’s contention about unlearned doxastic responses is no better 
supported than was his criticism of mentalism with respect to thesis (A); that is, the 
uncontroversial cases of justiﬁed external world belief count against Bergmann’s 
contention that unlearned external world beliefs can be justiﬁed; and, (ii) mentalism 
itself is neutral on the issue of whether unlearned doxastic responses can be 
justiﬁed. Thus, we would do well to look elsewhere to ﬁnd a relevant dispute. 
2.2 Bergmann on ‘‘Necessity’’ 
Before dismissing any Bergmannian objection along this line, we should consider 
Bergmann’s objections to what he calls Necessity, for he thinks that mentalists’ 
commitment to thesis (B) is closely related to what he takes to be their commitment 
to Necessity. 
Necessity: the [epistemic] ﬁttingness of doxastic response B to evidence E is 
an essential property of that response to that evidence. (2006, p. 112) 
Bergmann (2006, p. 113) treats Necessity as a thesis that paradigm evidentialists, 
such as Feldman and Conee, are committed to, a thesis that he claims also commits 
them to thesis (B).9 Like thesis (B), what Necessity says is somewhat obscure. Let 
us try to understand Bergmann’s point about it by ﬁrst considering the examples 
Bergmann uses to illustrate his criticism of Necessity. 
Case III: Due to cognitive malfunction caused by a radiation overdose, a 
human comes to have the tendency to form B1 in response to ME2. The same 
overdose also prevents her from ever noticing anything wrong with forming 
this belief this way. Since ME2 isn’t a reliable indicator of the truth of B1, the 
result is that B1 is not reliably formed. 
Case IV: A nonhuman cognizer with ‘‘design’’ plan B forms B1 in response to 
‘‘olfactory’’ sensation ME2. This belief is a reliably formed belief produced by 
that cognizer’s properly functioning faculties in an appropriate environment 
for the operation of those faculties. 
Case V: A nonhuman cognizer with ‘‘design’’ plan B forms B1 in response to 
ME2. This belief is a properly functioning unlearned doxastic response for 
such a creature to ME2. However, since this cognizer is a demon victim whose 
perceptual beliefs are all artiﬁcially produced, ME2 is not produced by actual 
contact with a billiard ball (nothing like such contact occurs for this cognizer). 
The result is that B1 is not reliably formed. 
Case VI: Due to cognitive malfunction caused by a radiation overdose, a 
nonhuman cognizer with ‘‘design’’ plan B comes to have the tendency to form 
B1 in response to ‘‘tactile’’ sensation ME1. The same overdose also prevents 
her from ever noticing anything wrong with forming this belief in this way. 
Since in this environment (which is an appropriate one for this cognizer) ME1 
isn’t a reliable indicator of the truth of B1, the result is that B1 is not reliably 
formed. (2006, pp. 137–8). 
Bergmann (2006, p. 139) says that reliabilist theories get case V wrong, whereas 
nonexternalists endorsing Necessity get cases IV, V, and VI wrong. His argument 
depends on his intuitive judgments about the cases: 
In both case IV and case V, B1 seems to be justiﬁed. For in those cases …, B1  
is a properly functioning and ﬁtting unlearned response to the main evidence 
despite the fact that, in case V, the belief is formed in an unreliable way. And 
since case VI is like case III in that B1 is a malfunctioning and unﬁtting 
unlearned response to the subject’s main evidence, B1 seems to be as 
unjustiﬁed in case VI as it is in case III. (2006, p. 138) 
9 Bergmann (2006, p. 113) says, ‘‘Evidentialists, by endorsing Necessity, give an afﬁrmative answer to (B)’’. 
2.3 The trouble with ‘‘Necessity’’ 
Are mentalists committed to the conclusions about cases IV, V, and VI that 
Bergmann charges them with? Using the EC view as our mentalist exemplar, note 
that the cases are under described for our purposes. In cases IV and V we are not 
told whether ME2 is part of the respective cognizer’s total evidence such that the 
proposition believed is part of the best explanation available to the cognizer. If it is, 
then the EC view, and thus mentalism, is consistent with Bergmann’s claim that B1 
is justiﬁed. In case VI, we are not told whether ME1 is part of the cognizer’s total 
evidence such that the proposition believed is part of the best explanation available 
to the cognizer. If it is not, then the EC view, and thus mentalism, is consistent with 
Bergmann’s claim that B1 is unjustiﬁed. 
Another problem with Bergmann’s commentary on Necessity is that the 
examples used for the purpose of criticizing mentalism and evidentialism rely on 
cases of unlearned doxastic responses. Case V is explicitly a case of an unlearned 
doxastic response, and Bergmann’s subsequent commentary indicates that the same 
goes in cases IV and VI. Again, I do not think that Bergmann’s main criticism of 
mentalist evidentialism turns on this issue, but, if it does, my criticism of 
Bergmann’s objection to thesis (B) applies to these cases as well. 
2.4 The substantive conﬂict 
We have, so far forth, failed to reveal a problem for mentalism that Bergmann’s 
examples are supposed to provide. To understand the crucial issue, we need to 
consider further details concerning ‘‘epistemic ﬁttingness’’, which appears in both 
thesis (B) and Necessity. One initial problem with taking Bergmann’s objection to 
mentalism as turning on Necessity is that mentalism itself does not entail 
Necessity.10 This is because mentalism does not imply anything substantive about 
evidence. Nevertheless, since Bergmann treats Necessity as a feature of leading 
evidentialist views such as Feldman and Conee’s, we may consider how 
Bergmann’s view of epistemic ﬁttingness conﬂicts with features of such views. 
We may appreciate the substantive conﬂict by considering some theses in the 
neighborhood of Necessity that are less obscure and which are accepted by the 
evidentialists under consideration: 
Uniqueness: At any time t and for any person S with any particular total 
evidence with respect to any proposition p, exactly one (at most) doxastic 
attitude (belief, or  disbelief, or  suspension of judgment) toward p is 
epistemically justiﬁed for S at t.11 
10 I do not claim that Bergmann takes mentalism to entail Necessity. He explicitly discusses Necessity as 
a thesis that evidentialists who are mentalists are committed to. I make the textual point for clarity’s sake. 
11 I think that many evidentialists implicitly endorse Uniqueness. For explicit discussions, see Feldman 
(2007, p. 205), who endorses Uniqueness; see White (2005), who argues against various anti-Uniqueness 
views; and see Christensen (2007), who offers some reasons in favor of what he calls ‘‘Rational 
Uniqueness’’—‘‘the view that there is a unique maximally epistemically rational response to any given 
evidential situation’’—saying that he ﬁnds the view to be ‘‘quite attractive’’. 
Uniqueness is about justiﬁcation. Bergmann’s idea is that what confers justiﬁcation 
just is whatever makes a doxastic attitude epistemically ﬁtting. So, the relevant 
thesis about epistemic ﬁttingness for the relevant evidentialists would be the 
following: 
Necessary Fittingness: At any time t and for any person S with any particular 
total evidence TE with respect to any proposition p, exactly one (at most) 
doxastic attitude (belief, or  disbelief, or  suspension of judgment) toward p is 
epistemically ﬁtting with respect to TE for S at t. 
As we have noted, Bergmann thinks that facts about epistemic ﬁttingness, and 
thus justiﬁcation, are contingent on facts about design plans. On his view, if there 
are two cognizers who possess exactly the same total evidence with respect to p at 
time t, one can justiﬁedly believe p at t and the other can justiﬁedly disbelieve p at t,  
and what explains the difference in justiﬁcation is a difference in design plan. Such 
a view is plainly inconsistent with Uniqueness and Necessary Fittingness. Thus, we 
have now located a clear dispute between Bergmann and the evidentialists whose 
views Bergmann criticizes. 
Before discussing the dispute, it may be helpful to distinguish and clarify some 
components of the evidentialist views I have been discussing. Mentalism—the 
conjunction of (S) and (M)—was introduced by Feldman and Conee as a means of 
distinguishing internalist views of justiﬁcation from externalist views. The EC 
view—Feldman and Conee’s explanatory coherence view of evidential support—is 
a speciﬁc evidentialist view consistent with mentalism. But, mentalism does not 
entail the EC view; indeed, mentalism does not even entail evidentialism (the view 
that justiﬁcation is entirely a matter of one’s evidence)12; and, since views about 
what constitutes one’s evidence can vary, evidentialism does not even entail 
mentalism. Although Bergmann is not careful in distinguishing mentalism from 
evidentialism, he is right to locate a serious dispute between paradigm evidentialists 
and himself concerning facts about doxastic epistemic ﬁttingness; for, those 
evidentialists (hereafter, mentalist evidentialists) are committed to Uniqueness and 
Necessary Fittingness, which Bergmann denies. For ease of presentation, I will use 
the term mentalist evidentialism to refer to the conjunction of mentalism, 
Uniqueness, Necessary Fittingness, and Necessary Support (discussed below). 
The question before us is this: what reason does Bergmann offer for denying 
Necessity (and, by extension, Uniqueness and Necessary Fittingness)? Apart from 
his commentary on the examples we have considered, the only reason Bergmann 
proffers is his intuitive judgment that his own view of doxastic ﬁttingness just is 
epistemic ﬁttingness. His central idea is this: a doxastic response is an epistemically 
ﬁtting response (i.e., the kind that makes for justiﬁed belief) only if it is a properly 
functioning response; and, it is a properly functioning response only if it is 
consistent with its design plan. 
What should we think of the proposal? No doubt it provides a way to understand 
doxastic ﬁttingness of some sort based on proper function. In cases IV and V, for 
instance, the cognizers form beliefs just as they were designed to form them, and 
12 For instance, responsible belief theorists can count as mentalists without counting as evidentialists. 
that indicates that those beliefs possess some form of doxastic ﬁttingness with 
respect to a design plan; but, it does not follow that the doxastic ﬁttingness 
illustrated is epistemic ﬁttingness; indeed, what constitutes epistemic ﬁttingness is 
the very point at issue. So, if he is to provide good reason—for anyone who does not 
share his view of epistemic ﬁttingness—to deny mentalist evidentialism on the basis 
of denying Necessary Fittingness, then he must provide a good non-partisan, 
independent reason, to believe that his account of doxastic ﬁttingness just is 
epistemic ﬁttingness, rather than an account consistent with Necessary Fittingness. 
We might look for such a reason in Bergmann’s commentary on his own theory 
of justiﬁcation (JPF): 
JPF: S’s belief B is justiﬁed iff (i) S does not take B to be defeated and (ii) the 
cognitive faculties producing B are (a) functioning properly, (b) truth-aimed 
and (c) reliable in the environments for which they were ‘‘designed’’. (2006, 
p. 133) 
Bergmann (2006, pp. 134–7) says that he includes clauses (ii) (b) and (ii) (c) in 
order to ensure that his analysis exempliﬁes epistemic ﬁttingness. He requires—as 
do mentalist evidentialists—that epistemic ﬁttingness is ‘‘objective’’ in the sense 
that one’s mere thinking that one’s belief caused by a cognitive faculty is 
epistemically ﬁtting is insufﬁcient for actual epistemic ﬁttingness. The idea behind 
Bergmann’s speciﬁc view is that his conditions exemplify epistemic ﬁttingness 
because they have something to do with an objective connection between sources of 
justiﬁed belief and truth, which is an epistemic good. This idea has some 
plausibility, but it does not show that Bergmann’s view of epistemic ﬁttingness is 
correct, since evidentialists can also plausibly say that epistemic ﬁttingness has 
something to do with an objective connection between sources of justiﬁcation and 
truth. For instance, Feldman and Conee (2004, p. 93)—(and many other 
nonexternalists)—think that only a well-founded belief that p (i.e., a belief based 
on what necessarily provides propositional justiﬁcation with respect to p) exhibits 
doxastic epistemic ﬁttingness. As Conee (2004) has argued, it is plausible that (1) 
propositional justiﬁcation is evidence of the truth of a proposition and (2) the ‘‘truth 
connection’’ between justiﬁcation and truth is the relation of evidential support. 
‘‘Well-foundedness’’ just adds that a belief is had on the basis of justiﬁers of the 
proposition believed. 
More can be said on behalf of mentalist evidentialists’ commitment to an 
objective connection between sources of justiﬁed belief and truth. A theoretical 
asset of mentalist evidentialism is that it is supported by the plausibility of what I 
call Necessary Support: 
Necessary Support: Under all possible conditions, any particular total body 
of evidence TE with respect to any proposition p is such that one, and only 
one, of the following is true: (i) TE supports the truth of p, or (ii) TE supports 
the truth of not-p, or (iii) TE supports the truth of p to the same extent that TE 
supports the truth of not-p. 
Given mentalist evidentialists’ commitment to mentalism, Necessary Support, 
Uniqueness, and Necessary Fittingness, the connection between sources of justiﬁed 
belief and truth implied by mentalist evidentialism is ‘‘objective’’ in Bergmann’s 
sense. It does not help Bergmann’s case to point out that mentalist evidentialism 
does not entail that justiﬁed beliefs are reliably produced, since the same goes for 
Bergmann’s theory.13 
Does it help Bergmann’s case that his theory entails that justiﬁed beliefs are 
reliably produced in the environment(s) for which they were designed, whereas 
typical evidentialist views do not? I presume that a number of those who think that 
some kind of reliability is required for justiﬁcation will think that this point counts 
in Bergmann’s favor, whereas most traditionalists about justiﬁcation will doubt it. 
Suppose, though, for the sake of argument, we grant that the point counts in 
Bergmann’s favor.14 Does it follow that we now have a good, non-question begging 
reason to deny Necessary Fittingness? No. This is because some views of 
justiﬁcation that entail Necessary Fittingness have additional theoretical assets of 
their own, assets that are at least as intuitively compelling, from a non-partisan 
perspective, as the one about environmental reliability. I shall illustrate these assets 
by means of an example that ﬁgures in my super-blooper epistemic design objection 
to JPF. 
2.5 The super-blooper epistemic design objection to JPF 
The super-blooper epistemic design objection utilizes an example15: Suppose that 
there is a powerful, knowledgeable Humean ‘‘infant deity’’ Z who has created 
cognizers that are approximately as intelligent as humans.16 Z has designed his 
cognizers reliably to believe truths in various circumstances of the environment in 
which he has placed them. Accordingly, the ‘‘Z-design plan’’ calls for Z’s created 
cognizers to form belief B2 (there exists a powerful personal creator, and there is a 
family of trolls living deep under my planet’s surface), as an inference from their 
belief that p (I’m experiencing olfactory sensations O)—which are of the type that 
ordinary humans have when they smell a meadow full of ﬂowers—and their belief 
that q (if p, then there exists a powerful personal creator, and there is a family of 
trolls living deep under my planet’s surface).17 The cognizers are designed to 
believe p and q upon physical contact with another Z-designed cognizer, and they 
are designed not to notice that they have no reason to believe that appreciating the 
content of q’s antecedent provides a good reason to believe q’s consequent 
13 Bergmann (2006, p. 134) explicitly acknowledges this, treating the point as a theoretical asset of his 
theory, since it allows for the correct results concerning the new evil demon problem, whereas reliabilist 
theories do not. 
14 As I explain in Sect. 3, there is a good reason to deny that this point counts in Bergmann’s favor. 
15 This example has roughly the same structure as one in Long (forthcoming), but here it is used for a 
different purpose. 
16 In Part V of his commentary, David Hume (1993) suggests that this much of my imaginary creation­
and-design story is consistent with what we know of our own world and its human cognizers. 
17 For those who want a story: Although Z is an immature deity whose created world falls far short of a 
best possible world, Z, having recently been infuriated by the deceptions of his older siblings, has 
developed a passion for honesty and truth about some matters; and, due to his youthful vanity, Z has 
designed those cognizers such that their happiness depends in part on their believing that Z exists. 
 
(in contrast with the fact that they are designed to appreciate, say, that Rex is 
running unaided gives them reason to believe that Rex has legs); accordingly, they 
don’t take themselves to have a defeater for q (just as it is with p). Also, being 
designed to keep all these beliefs to themselves, the cognizers have no reason to 
believe that there is a family of trolls living under their planet’s surface (i.e., it does 
not seem to them that they have sensory experience of trolls, or that they have heard 
testimony about actual trolls, etc.).18 Suppose further that p, q, and the proposition 
expressed by B2 are all true in the world envisioned whenever a cognizer in that 
world believes those propositions. Having frequent contact with others, these 
cognizers frequently engage in a belief-forming inference from (p and q) to the 
content of B2, forming B2 on the basis of that inference.19 The cognitive faculties 
producing those beliefs are successfully aimed at truth (in Bergmann’s sense), for 
those faculties are likely to produce true beliefs when operating in the environment 
for which they were designed. 
Suppose that one Z-designed cognizer, Mork, has just formed B2 as described 
and that Mork’s relevant cognitive faculties are functioning as designed, are truth-
aimed, are reliable in the environments for which they were designed, and Mork 
does not take B2 to be defeated. JPF implies that Mork’s belief B2, as well as his 
belief that p and his belief that q, are epistemically justiﬁed. According to 
Bergmann, then, all of these beliefs exhibit doxastic epistemic ﬁttingness. 
However, consultation with my intuitions (and, I predict, most of yours) about the 
case produces a very conﬁdent belief that Mork’s forming B2 in the way indicated 
does not exhibit epistemic ﬁttingness, even if it exhibits some kind of doxastic 
ﬁttingness. I daresay that many externalists will agree, for there is good reason to do 
so. Mork’s method is intellectually poor: it is an irrational, objectively bad way to 
reason, even if he cannot help it and even if it gets him onto the truth.20 Mentalist 
evidentialism easily preserves this judgment, in part because it is committed to 
Necessary Support, which provides support for Necessary Fittingness. 
This point seems even more compelling when we add to the story. Suppose that 
Spork—another cognizer under the Z-design plan—comes to realize that she has 
reason to think that the truth of q’s consequent is not connected to the truth of q’s 
antecedent, and, as a result, Spork disbelieves that q. On the basis of this realization, 
Spork suspends judgment on the content of B2. It seems that Spork is reasoning 
well, and this suggests that her disbelief that q and her suspension of judgment on 
the content of B2 are justiﬁed. I think Bergmann would say that the correct 
evaluation of these attitudes depends on a contingent fact concerning whether 
18 For those who want a story: Z has a reason for the cognizers to believe in the trolls’ existence: such 
beliefs are designed to have a salutary role in their unconscious dreams, providing some psychological aid 
in their struggles against the hardship and suffering that Z predicts they will endure due to details of the 
particular world Z has designed and created. 
19 Other scenarios serve the same point. Simpler Alternative Story (drop the conjunction): Under the 
conditions described, the cognizers are designed to engage in an inference from p to the content of B2. 
Weirder Alternative Story (invalid reasoning): The cognizers are designed to engage in an invalid 
inference, say, if p then q; r (I’m a cognizer); thus, the content of B2. 
20 And perhaps things are even worse in the Weirder Alternative Story (see footnote 19). 
Spork’s realization is part of the defeater system part of the Z-design plan.21 So, let 
us suppose that Spork’s realization is not consistent with the Z-design plan’s 
defeater system. Accordingly, JPF implies that Spork’s disbelief that q is 
unjustiﬁed.22 So, JPF is mistaken: Spork reasons well, and this suggests that all of 
her discussed doxastic attitudes are justiﬁed; but, she does not believe as designed.23 
Although I do not claim to have demonstrated that JPF is false, reﬂection on the 
examples gives us a reason to doubt JPF. What drives our sense that we have such a 
reason? What else could it be—at the level of abstraction with which we are here 
concerned—than our sense that Necessary Support and Necessary Fittingness are 
true? The views preserve our sense that there are essentially good ways and 
essentially bad ways of engaging in epistemically rational inquiry; the good ways do 
not become epistemically bad if one’s design plan fails to sanction them, and the 
bad ways do not become epistemically good if one’s design plan happens to 
sanction them. Mentalist evidentialism easily preserves these claims. 
The super-blooper epistemic design examples reveal another asset of mentalist 
evidentialism: it has the resources to secure an intimate relation between epistemic 
justiﬁcation and epistemic rationality, a relation that has been a hallmark of 
traditional views of epistemic justiﬁcation going back at least to the Socrates of 
Plato’s Meno.24 Typical evidentialist views of justiﬁcation have it that one must 
have evidence indicating the truth of a proposition in order for one to be justiﬁed in 
believing that proposition; and, one’s having evidence indicating the truth of a 
proposition very plausibly constitutes one’s having a reason to believe that 
proposition; hence, typical evidentialist views imply that there is an intimate 
relation between epistemic justiﬁcation and epistemic rationality. 
JPF, however, does not imply that there is an intimate relation between epistemic 
justiﬁcation and epistemic rationality. Consider the doxastic attitudes of Mork, for 
example. On JPF, Mork’s belief that q and his belief B2 are epistemically justiﬁed, 
but those beliefs are not epistemically rational. For his beliefs to be epistemically 
rational, Mork would have to have a reason with respect to the propositions 
believed.25 But, he lacks a reason to believe that q. And, although Mork’s belief B2, 
being the result of an inference, can be said to have been formed on the basis of 
21 Bergmann (2006, p. 170) says that ‘‘defeater systems’’ are ‘‘similar to belief-forming systems, except 
that the result of their operation is belief loss not belief production’’.
 
22 Since JPF is about belief (and does not mention suspension of judgment), JPF seems to be silent on the
 
justiﬁcatory status of Spork’s suspending judgment on the content of B2.
 
23 Reﬂection on the fact that Bergmann builds the defeater system into the relevant design plan for any
 
cognizer prompts the thought that there is little hope of adding a clause to Bergmann’s account of
 
epistemic defeat that will both count Spork’s belief as justiﬁed and avoid entailing Necessary Fittingness
 
or an evidentialist-friendly account of epistemic defeat.
 
24 According to Plato’s Meno [97e], Socrates says that the difference between true belief and knowledge 
is ‘‘an account of the reason why’’ (Plato, 2002, p. 90). 
25 Here I rely on straightforward deﬁnitions of ‘‘rational’’: ‘‘having reason or understanding’’ (Webster); 
‘‘reason, reasonableness’’ (Princeton WordNet); ‘‘of or based on reasoning or reason’’ (Oxford English 
Reference). In recent years, some have used ‘‘rational’’ or ‘‘epistemically rational’’ in ways that have 
nothing at all to do with one’s having reason, but such uses strike me as untoward stretches of the word. In 
any case, take my point in the text to be that typical evidentialist views of epistemic justiﬁcation preserve 
a tight connection between justiﬁed belief and reasonable belief. 
reasoning, B2 is surely epistemically irrational, since Mork literally has no reason to 
believe the content of B2.26 Now consider the doxastic attitudes of Spork. They are 
epistemically rational, but according to JPF, unjustiﬁed.
27 Thus, JPF does not have 
the resources to secure an intimate relation between justiﬁcation and rationality.28 
So, on the one hand we have JPF, which entails the denial of Necessary 
Fittingness, since it implies that the epistemic ﬁttingness (or unﬁttingness) of an 
agent’s doxastic response to the agent’s evidence can be due to a contingent feature 
(i.e., the ‘‘design’’ plan, which could vary across possible cognizers); and, on the 
other we have mentalist evidentialism, which is committed to mentalism, Necessary 
Support, Uniqueness, and Necessary Fittingness. Each view, we might think from a 
non-partisan perspective, has some theoretical assets. What reason does Bergmann 
offer for adjudicating the views? He offers his controversial judgments about the 
cases we have considered, judgments that are supported by nothing more than the 
claim that his view of epistemic ﬁttingness—which is revisionary and question­
begging—is correct. Hence, Bergmann has not provided a reason, for anyone who 
does not share his view of epistemic ﬁttingness, to deny Necessary Fittingness. 
I conclude that Bergmann’s objections directed to thesis (B) and Necessity fail to 
reveal a problem for mentalism. 
3 On Bergmann’s third objection 
Bergmann’s third objection to mentalism is that it is ‘‘unmotivated’’ (2006, 
pp. 59–61). He argues for the claim by responding to what he takes to be two 
proposed motivations for mentalism in work by Feldman and Conee. One is a 
defense by Feldman of thesis (B). But, for the reasons discussed above, Feldman has 
not defended (B) or Necessity (as Bergmann characterizes it); so, we should 
consider Bergmann’s discussion of Feldman’s argument as applied to mentalist 
evidentialism. Accordingly, the truth of mentalist evidentialism helps to explain 
why mentalism can—but externalist theories such as reliabilism cannot—support 
the intuitively compelling view that demon-worlders have the same justiﬁed beliefs 
as their introspectively identical non-demon-world twins. Bergmann’s response is 
that JPF does just as well as mentalism on this score, without being committed to 
reliabilism; hence, Feldman’s argument provides no good reason to prefer 
mentalism over Bergmann’s externalism. 
The trouble is that JPF does not do just as well as mentalism with respect to the 
new evil demon problem. Intuitively, our introspectively identical twins in demon 
worlds have the same justiﬁed beliefs as us despite the fact that they are radically 
and systematically deceived. JPF plausibly gets the right results only in demon 
worlds in which the cognizers are under roughly the same design plan that we are 
26 Mork may feel impelled to believe the content of B2, but a feeling of impulsion is not itself a truth-
indicating reason. For discussion of this point, see Long 2010: 384–386, Conee 1998, and Conee and 
Feldman 2004b: 64–67. 
27 Spork’s suspension of judgment on the content of B2 is an exception, since JPF says nothing about
 
suspension of judgment.
 
28 For further discussion of this point, see Long (forthcoming).
 
under; it gets the wrong results in demon worlds where cognizers have been 
designed by the demon, for in those worlds, the processes producing the beliefs of 
our mental twins are not reliable in the environments for which they were designed; 
thus, JPF has a severely restricted application in preserving intuitions with respect to 
the new evil demon problem.29 Mentalism implies no such restriction on demon 
worlds. This point provides a signiﬁcant motivation for mentalism. 
The other proposed motivation that Bergmann discusses is Conee and Feldman’s 
claim that mentalism provides the best explanation of our intuitive judgments about 
certain example pairs. Bergmann’s response (2006, pp. 59–60) has two parts: (1) 
The example pairs Conee and Feldman use in support of their mentalist view are 
handled easily by JPF
30
; and (2) there are additional examples which are better 
handled by JPF than by mentalism. But, even if JPF handles Conee and Feldman’s 
cases as well as mentalism does, once we appreciate the points I have made we are 
in a position to see that Bergmann’s additional examples do not provide any reason 
to deny mentalism for anyone who does not already accept Bergmann’s view of 
epistemic ﬁttingness: after all, the additional examples Bergmann offers to illustrate 
the superiority of his theory are the very examples we have considered. 
After the dialectical dust settles, all that remains for Bergmann are his intuitive 
judgments about his examples. But, those judgments are deeply controversial31; 
and, if all we have to go on are epistemologists’ intuitions about the cases, they 
provide modest reason to accept mentalism and mentalist evidentialism (and, thus, 
to ‘‘motivate’’ them) over JPF, since, from the perspective of the nonskeptical 
tradition from which Bergmann is working, every uncontroversial case of justiﬁed 
belief is consistent with the discussed features of mentalism and mentalist 
evidentialism. But, we now have more to go on, namely, the super-blooper 
epistemic design objection. Reﬂection on the example it employs provides 
additional reason to prefer mentalism and mentalist evidentialism. 
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